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成现实和未来趋势，只有这样，IMF 才能面对 21 世纪的挑战，获得更长久的生


































The active decision-making mechanism of IMF (the International Monetary Fund) 
was established over sixty years ago, against the given background after war. 
However, over the several decades, there have been many significant changes in 
international economic and political situation, as well as security position. At the same 
time, the patterns in managing global affairs have changed a lot. Therefore, in order to 
follow the step of time, the reform of international monetary system should be in 
compliance with the changes. As one of the most important international financial 
institutions, IMF’s transformation should reflect the new global pattern and adapt 
itself to the new environment. Only in this way, will IMF be able to overcome the 
challenges in 21st century and contribute to the whole world. In this case, it is 
necessary to do research on the reform of the   decision-making mechanism of IMF 
in a broader background of global governing. 
Correlative points of international political economy and public choice theory have 
been introduced into this research. The article shows that: on the one hand, the 
existing decision-making mechanism of IMF guarantees virtuous decisions; on the 
other hand, there are some deficiencies in its institution and rationality, and a distinct 
imbalance in authority distribution. IMF can no longer play its role well if the 
inequality will still exist in a long period. The sole approach for IMF to keep its 
vitality is to carry out a thorough reformation in its decision-making mechanism. The 
final aim is to achieve equilibrium and multilevel in the process of making decisions 
and to make the decisions more transparent and responsible. 
Structures of the article are: 
Chapter one addresses the issue of the active decision-making mechanism of IMF from the 
aspects of voting rules and institutions. 
Chapter two evaluates the efficiency of the active mechanism. According to public 
choice theory, the analysis indicates that the active mechanism is efficient. 
Chapter three evaluates the equality of the active mechanism. According to 













are some significant deficiencies in its equality. 
Chapter four analyzes the inevitability of reforming decision-making mechanism, 
and addresses the requirements of developing countries. 
Chapter five points out that the final aim is to achieve equilibrium and multilevel 
in the process of making decisions and to make the decisions more transparent and 
responsible. In the end, it makes clear the positions of China. 
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关系到 IMF 本身的宗旨及存在的价值评判。 
宋宇力（2002）认为，改革 IMF 决策机制应从两方面入手：改变份额分配方
案，增加发展中国家的份额；限制需要特别多数票通过的事项的数量。而增强
























制使得 IMF 的决策具有非对称性。另一方面，IMF 的组织性义务具有继承性和相
对稳定性，但其权利却在不断扩大和强化。IMF 的权利和义务也具有不对称性。 
要提升现有国际货币体系的内在稳定性首先要对 IMF 进行改造。对 IMF 进行改革
的要点在于：对 IMF 的组织机构和运行机制进行内部性改革，增加机构设计的对
称性和均衡性。 
钟伟（2005）提出，“审视调整 IMF 基金份额的呼声”是 IMF 在 21 世纪的
核心议题之一。文章还详细分析了“推动 IMF 内部治理结构的合理化”问题。
他认为，IMF 的内部治理结构方面的缺陷日益明显，IMF 的执行层面的变动未能
和 60 年来国际经济格局的变迁保持同步。IMF 应该充分关注其基金份额、投票
权和执行董事层面构成的合理性，使其能反应 60 年来国际政治和经济格局的巨
大变迁。文章还指出，IMF 的执行主席选举应该保持可以理解的透明度。他认为，
在 IMF 执行董事会于 2004 年 4 月签署的有关选举程序的新原则和特定过程中，
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第一章  IMF 现行决策机制 
国际组织的意识形态决定了该组织的基本立场，同时也在很大程度上影响着
它的组织结构和决策机制。而组织产生的历史背景则直接左右着该组织的制度设
计。因此，分析 IMF 的意识形态和历史背景有助于更好地研究其决策机制。 













的假设为 IMF 经济政策的设计提供了理论基础。 
第二节  历史背景 
二战即将结束时，美、英等国为了改变过去 20 多年间各国货币竞相恶意贬
值，币制极端混乱的局面，提出了“经济合作”计划，而最先提出的就是战后货
币计划。1944 年 4 月，美、英、加拿大等国发表了“国际货币联合宣言”。同年
7 月 1 日至 22 日，45 个参加筹建联合国的国家在美国的新罕布什尔州的布雷顿
森林举行了国际货币金融会议，通过了《国际货币基金组织协定》，确立了被称
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权；第二，成员国按分得的份额每 10 万个 SDR 的基金份额增加 1 票；第三，凡
截至投票日，成员国每贷出 40 万 SDR 增加 1 票，反之则减少 1 票①。 
份额（quota）是每个成员国向 IMF 认缴的一定数额的资金，从财务角度看相当
于股本。份额以 SDR 计值，成员国必须全额缴纳其份额。1978 年 4 月 1 日第二
次基金协定修订生效之前，成员国缴纳份额的 25％以黄金支付，其余 75％以本
国货币支付；之后，25％则以 IMF 规定的储备资产（SDR 或可兑换货币）缴纳，
其余 75％仍以本国货币缴纳。 
                                                        













Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
